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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.J. \V. EDG1\R, alk/a JIM EDGAR
and E Y"l~~L YN EDGAR, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents~

Civil No.
10159

vs.
CO~llllNED

PRODUCTION ASSOCLATES, LTD., A Utah CorporatiOit,

J)cj'cndant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

S'LATEl\IENT OF THE l(IND OF CASE
This is an action to collect $9,000.00 on a contract.

DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the court at a pre-trial hearing. Fr01n the summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
defendant appeals.
..)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and seeks judgment in its favor as a
matter of law, or that failing, a trial.
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
The Plaintiffs' were the owners of a one-quarter
interest in mining claims, known as Blue Star, Blue
Star No. 1 and Blue Star No. 2, located in Eureka
County, Nevada. In 1959, Plaintiffs and the other
owners leased the claims and by mesne assignments,
the Lease came into the possession of the Defendant,
Combined Production Associates, Ltd.
On December 9, 1962, Mr. A. B. Thomas, President of Defendant Corporation, met with the Plaintiffs
and asked them to sign an Amendment to this ~ease.
This document was entitled "Amendment to Mining
Lease & Options," and shall hereafter be referred to as
"Amendment." Plaintiffs refused to sign the Amendment because it placed obligations on them that they
did not have under the original Lease. Mr. Thomas
then offered Plaintiffs $10,000 for their one-quarter
interest in the Blue Star Mining Claims, payable
$1,000.00 by check and $9,000.00 by note of Combined
ProductionAssociates, Ltd.,personally endorsed byhim,
payable on June 15, 1963. As evidence of this agreement, Mr. A. B. Thomas wrote out the memo which
is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint as Exhibit "A"
(R 2-a). The Plaintiffs were still dissatisfied with the
4
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arrangement. because the Amendment still required
the Plaintiffs and other Lessors to agree upon the
loeation of the mining claims. Therefore, in order to
satisfy this requirement, Mr. Thomas added the paragraph that appears on the bottom of the memo (Exhibit "A''). This satisfied the Plaintiffs and they accepted the check from Mr. Thomas. It was further
agreed by the parties at that time that one other person
by the name of Travis Edgar had to sign the plat,
agreeing to the location of the claims and as soon as
that was done, the agreement was to go into effect. A
few days later, the Plaintiffs received the telegram
(R .t<l), as follows:
"Thanks for everything. Morris leaves this
afternoon for Albuquerque. Check and note will
be good the minute Travis signs, which should
be tomorrow. Will work hard for a payout to
you before June 15th. Regards. Combined Production Associates, A. B. Thomas."
Then on December 15th, another telegram (R 42)
was received by the Plaintiffs, as follows:
''Travis has signed. Deposit check. Note will
reach you in a few days."
The note never arrived and on June 15, 1963, the
date the balance of the $9,000.00 became due, Plaintiffs
made demand upon Thomas for payment, which was
refused and this action was started. Thereafter, Combined Production Associates, Ltd., sold a one-half
interest in the Lease to Sierra de Oro, a Nevada Corporation (R 30 to 33).

5
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT.
The simple handwritten agreement, together with
the two telegrams, sets forth a clear, intelligible contract between the parties. The contract was contingent
upon the signing of a document by Travis Edgar, but
the telegram clearly recites that "Travis has signed"
and that the agreement went into effect. The agreement of the parties is simply set out as follows: If
the Plaintiffs would sign the Amendment to the Lease
which was presented to them, Defendant agreed to buy
their one-quarter interest in the claims from the Plaintiffs for $10,000.00, payable $1,000.00 cash and the
balance on June 15, 1963. The whole arrangement was
contingent upon Travis Edgar signing and the telegram clearly states that Travis had signed. Therefore,
there was immediately a binding and enforceable agreement.
POINT r2. THAT PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF
ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AND UNENFORCEABLE F 0 R
LACK OF MUTUALITY.
There is more to this action than a simple sale of
the claims: The Plaintiffs executed an Amendment, as
requested by the President of the Defendant Corporation. This new Amendment placed burdens upon the
6
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I .essors that they had not previously had, so the consideration for the sale \vas two-fold: ( 1) The signing
of the mewlment, and ( :Z) $10,000.00 represented by
$1.000.00 in cash and the balance to be by a promissory
note.
i \

Except for the conveyance of the mining leases, the
l >lain tiffs had complied with the terms of the agree-

ment, and this was certainly a sufficient performance
to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
It has long been recognized that part performance
of a parol contract for the sale of real estate has the
effect of taking such contract from the operation of
the Statute of Frauds, so that equity may decree its
specific performance or grant other equitable relief.
The basis for this doctrine is set out in 49 Am J ur 421
(paragraph :t21) :
''The true basis of the doctrine of part perfonnance, according to the overwhelming weight
of authority, is that it would be a fraud upon the
plaintiff if the defendant were permitted to
escape perforn1ance of his part of the oral agreeInent after he has permitted the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the agreement. The oral
contract is enforced in harmony with the principle that courts of equity will not allow the
statute of frauds to be used as an instrument
of fraud. In other words, the doctrine of part
performance was established for the same purpose for which the statute of frauds itself was
enacted, namely, for the prevention of fraud,
and arose from the necessity of preventing the
statute from becoming an agent of fraud, for it
7
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could not have been the intention of the statute
to enable any party to commit a fraud with impunity.''
Utah has recognized this doctrine and the rule as
set out in re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595 (at page
601):
"This Court has adopted and followed the
general rule laid down by Besse v. McHenry,
89 Mont. 520, 300 P. 199, which states: "Part
performance which will avoid statute of frauds
may consist of any act which puts party performing in such position that nonperformance
by other would constitute fraud."
(See cases cited therein) .
Since the Plaintiffs have now signed the Amendment to the Lease, which Lease has been negotiated
to the Corporation, Sierra de Oro (R 30-33), Plaintiffs are precluded from suing for rescission of the contract, since the rights of innocent third parties have
intervened. Therefore, if the Defendant were allowed
to set up the defense of the Statute of Frauds, then
the very thing the Statute tries to guard against would
occur-a fraud would be perpetrated on Plaintiffs. They
have signed the Amendment and it cannot now be
rescinded.
Defendant has set out as a defense that there was
no mutuality of remedy. This Court has long recognized the principle that where one person has perforn1ed
under the contract, the fact that the other person may
not have been able to require performance is no defense
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to the action. ln Utah _jlercur Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel (~old 1\lin. Co., 134 P.2d 1094 (at page 1097),
this Court said:

.. Hespondents contend the prayer if granted
would in effect require specific performance in
that plaintiffs would be put in possession with
leave to continue development. They contend
that the principle of mutuality of remedy preyeuts the court from granting specific performance because if the plaintiffs had refused to go
on with the agreed development the court could
not compel them to do so. We see no merit in
the co'urt refusing to grant performance to a
petitioner where he has performed his part simply
because the respondent might not or could not
obtain specific performance if the shoe had been
on the other foot.'-' (Emphasis added).
In Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah
88 ,80 P.2d 930, 934, we said "The old doctrine
of n1utuality of remedy is a concrete example of
a rule which has been so eroded by necessary
exceptions as to leave it more of a vestige than
a substantiality." It is very difficult to see why
a person who refuses to perform where the other
has performed may stand up in court and say:
"Even though he has done what the contract
required of him and I have not, you should not
1nake me perform because if he had not performed and I had not performed or tendered
performance I could not obtain the remedy of
specific performance." The remedy of one should
not depend upon the hypothetical case of what
another could demand if the situation were different."
()
./
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POINT 3. THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED
TO TENDER A DEED TO THE CLAIMS OR
SHOW OWNERSHIP OF THE CLAil\1S AT
THE TIME OF THE HEARING.
The Defendant Corporation has been in possession
of the claims under the Lease and has been operating
them for a long period of time; therefore, was in a better
position to know the status of the title than were the
Plaintiffs themselves. It was for this reason that the
paragraph on the bottom of the agreement was added,
relating to the acceptance of the position of the claims.
Also, the Vendors under a contract cannot be obligated
to assume any greater responsibility than is contained
within their contract. The contract does not contain
any requirement as to the warranty of the claims; only
the statement that they were to "assign" the Blue Star
interest (R 2-a). If the Defendant had desired any
warranty as to the title, it certainly would have added
that to the document. Having failed to make that requirement, it cannot now insist upon anything further
than a conveyance of, whatever interest the Plaintiffs
may have in and to the claims.
Since Defendant is in possession of the property,
is it now estopped to deny the Plaintiffs' title. At 55
Am Jur 800 (paragraph 375), the rule is stated as
follows:
"It is a universally recognized rule that no one
who has entered into the possession of land under
an executory contract of sale is estopped from
denying or questioning his vendor's title for the
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purpose of defeating the agreement or the rights
of the Yendor thereunder. The principle upon
whieh the rule rests is that the purchaser is
estopped to deny the title of the vendor, because
he acknow Iedged it and gained possession by his
purchase, and he ought not then in conscience,
as between them, be allowed to enjoy the fruits
of his contract and not pay the full consideration."
\Vith regard to the requirement of a tender, there
hus never been any hesitation on the part of the Plaintiffs to Inake a deed of the claims available to the Defendant, at such time as the balance of the purchase
price was paid. The Plaintiffs will now stipulate with
the Defendant that a deed to the claims may be delivered
to the Clerk of the Court, to be delivered to the Defendant upon payment of the $9,000.00, plus interest
and costs. But certainly, equity does not require that
a deed be delivered merely because a Judgment has
been entered, since there is no assurance that a J udgment can be or will be collectible against the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
The J udgn1ent against Defendant, Combined Production ..tissociates, Ltd., should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON & BETTILYON
Y"erden E. Bettilyon
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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